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ABSTRACT
An important challenge in the process of tracking and detecting
the dissemination of misinformation is to understand the gap in
the political views between people that engage with the so called
”fake news”. A possible factor responsible for this gap is opinion
polarization, which may prompt the general public to classify con-
tent that they disagree or want to discredit as fake. In this work, we
study the relationship between political polarization and content
reported by Twier users as related to ”fake news”. We investigate
how polarization may create distinct narratives on what misinfor-
mation actually is. We perform our study based on two datasets
collected from Twier. e rst dataset contains tweets about US
politics in general, from which we compute the political leaning
of each user towards the Republican and Democratic Party. In the
second dataset, we collect tweets and URLs that co-occurred with
”fake news” related keywords and hashtags, such as #FakeNews
and #AlternativeFact, as well as reactions towards such tweets and
URLs. We then analyze the relationship between polarization and
what is perceived as misinformation, and whether users are des-
ignating information that they disagree as fake. Our results show
an increase in the polarization of users and URLs (in terms of their
associated political viewpoints) for information labeled with fake-
news keywords and hashtags, when compared to information not
labeled as ”fake news”. We discuss the impact of our ndings on
the challenges of tracking ”fake news” in the ongoing bale against
misinformation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online social networks have changed the news consumption habits
of many, since they present news in a structure which diers dramat-
ically from previous media technologies [26]. Online content can
be spread with lile or no ltering, and sources with negligible or
unknown reputation may reach as many readers as established me-
dia outlets [1]. e prots derive mainly from clicks that aract the
reader to the media’s website, which increases the “tabloidization”
of the headlines [7]. e information to which users are exposed
is selected through recommendation algorithms [25], which may
create ”lter bubbles”, separating users from information (and news)
that disagrees with their viewpoints [29].
In this context, two phenomena have been increasingly receiv-
ing aention due their potential impact on important societal pro-
cesses [1, 3]: the rapid spread of a growing number of unsubstanti-
ated or false information online [12], recently named as ”fake news”,
and the increase of opinion polarization [1, 15]. Previous studies
suggest a dual interaction between the two. e polarized ”echo
chamber” communities are more susceptible to the dissemination of
misinformation [12]. Conversely, misinformation plays a key role
in creating polarized groups [43]. Another way these phenomena
may interact is when users incorrectly classify news as sources of
misinformation simply due to disagreement, not because it reports
actual false or imprecise facts [23]. is behavior creates alternative
narratives of what is actually fake, which depends on one’s political
ideology, and that, ultimately, make the line between biased and
fake information more blurry.
In this paper we conduct an initial analysis on the relationships
and interactions between polarized debate and the spread of mis-
information on datasets collected from Twier1. We examine the
following research questions:
Q1: How is polarization quantitatively related to
information perceived as or related to fake news?
Q2: Are users designating content that they disagree
with as misinformation?
We analyze a dataset composed of tweets on content associated with
”fake news” and general tweets about U.S. politics. Our methodol-
ogy employs a community detection method designed to estimate
the degree of polarization of each user 2 leaning towards the Demo-
cratic or Republican parties, as depicted in Figure 1. Based on these
estimates, we correlate user polarization levels to their interactions
with #FakeNews-related tweets and external URLs. We analyze
1hps://twier.com/
2We employ the term polarization for both the collective phenomena of opposition of
opinions and to designate how much an individual user or URL leans towards a set of
views or an ideology.
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Figure 1: Network of retweets showing democrats (in blue)
and republicans (in red) divided into two distinct commu-
nities. What is the impact of such polarization in what is
perceived as ”fake news”?
how the polarization of such tweets and URLs is related to their
popularity and to the frequency they are associated with the theme
of misinformation by users. We also analyze the polarization dier-
ences between users who merely discuss politics versus those who
engage with tweets and URLs related to fake news.
Our data analysis process shows three main ndings:
(1) ere is an increase in polarization on the URLs and users
associated with fake-news related keywords and hash-tags;
(2) Polarized groups cite sources on their side of political spec-
trum to tag or condemn news and statements given by the
other opposite group as fake;
(3) Polarized users employ terms such as ”fake news” to refer
to content that they particularly disagree with.
We discuss the impact of these ndings in the ongoing bale against
the spread of online misinformation online. We suggest, for ex-
ample, that approaches based on crowd-source [32] to detect fake
news may become biased towards political ideologies, once the
narratives on what is fake seem to be quite dierent across groups
with dierent ideologies.
e remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews previous work on the spread of online misinformation
and on opinion polarization. Section 3 describes the methodology
behind the data collection and data analysis processes. Section 4
presents and discusses the results of our analysis. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper and outline future research directions.
2 RELATEDWORK
e spread of online misinformation3 and ”fake news” has become
an increasingly important topic for its possible impact in societal
3Some sources distinguish misinformation and disinformation based on intention, we
use misinformation for both.
processes such as political elections and public policies [2]. Closely
tied to ”fake news” are the so-called ”alternative narratives” such as
conspiracy theories [33]. ere is an ongoing eort in the research
community to understand the spread and propagation of such kinds
of content. Some of the approaches taken are to propose network
diusion models [37, 40], and analyzing network structural features
of the propagation of misinformation in online social networks [20,
22].
Some eort has also been done to detect misinformation, includ-
ing strategies that apply text-based methods [10], fact-checking
through knowledge graphs [8], crowd-sourcing solutions [32], and
even verifying the authenticity of images spread online [30]. ere
are also recent aempts on detecting the spread of misinforma-
tion using regularities on their propagation paerns through social
networks, with limited success so far [11]. Besides that, previ-
ous studies also aempt to contain the spread of misinformation,
nding near-optimal ways of disseminating information that may
revert the damage caused by a rumor [5] or even strategies to clarify
misinformation from a physicological perspective [23].
Another line of research surrounds the existence of political
bots that spread misinformation. ere are several studies on the
impact of such bots in specic countries [14, 17], as well as more
general studies on their strategies and particularities [42] and on
methods for detecting them [13]. e existence of such bots may
have a strategic role in political debate, inuencing, for instance,
the trending hashtags on Twier [17] and are a threat to healthy
and productive political discourse. is makes the understanding
and combat of such bots network an important challenge for the
scientic community [34].
e association between opinion polarization and ”fake news”
accusations has been suggested in the media as strong; people
would just label as ”fake” any information or sources they do not
support [4, 28]. From the sociological perspective, polarization
may be formally understood as a state that “refers to the extent
to which opinions on an issue are opposed in relation to some
theoretical maximum”, and, as a process, it is the increase in such
opposition over time, causing a social group to divide itself into
two sub-groups with conicting and antagonistic viewpoints re-
garding a topic [18, 31, 35]. Understanding polarization in online
discussions and the social structures induced by polarized debate
is important because polarization of opinions induces segregation
in the society, causing people with dierent viewpoints to become
isolated in islands where everyone thinks like them. Such ”lter
bubbles” caused by social media systems limits the exposure of users
to ideologically diverse content, and is a growing concern [15, 21].
Recommendation algorithms in social media contexts may increase
the scale of polarization even more, as they can automatically sep-
arate users from alternate viewpoints on polarized issues by not
showing those on their feeds [29].
is work is a rst aempt to test the hypothesis that ”fake
news” narratives are correlated to political polarization. It diers
from much of the preexisting work as it considers the possibility of
individuals tagging as misinformation content that they disagree
with. If signicant, this adds another layer of complexity to the
problem, as we need to distinct perceived ”fake news” from what is
actually misinformation.
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Figure 2: Methodology to collect the URLs agged as fake news, general tweets that tweeted this URL, and general tweets on
politics, and then build a dataset that encompasses the polarized reactions of users to an URL. We also exemplify how the
calculation of the polarization of the URL is performed on the right-hand side, as it is further discussed in Section 3.3
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section we describe the methodology used to collect the data
and the more important methods used in the data analysis process.
3.1 Data Collection
Our data collection strategy is shown in Figure 2. We study two
datasets in conjunction, both obtained from Twier. e rst dataset
was built to monitor narratives and discussions surrounding fake
news. To do so, we performed two simultaneous data collection
eorts, using the Stream4 and the Search APIs5. e Stream API
allows you to gather large amounts of data currently being tweeted
whereas the Search API allows you to search for tweets mentioning
specic keywords (among countless other parameters).
(1) In the rst step, we collect the stream of tweets contain-
ing the following keywords and hashtags from Twier’s
Stream API:
{fakenews, #fakenews, fake-news, #fake-news,
posttruth, #posttruth, post-truth,
#post-truth, alternativefact,
#alternativefact, alternative-fact,
#alternative-fact}
We then proceed to store the URLs being mentioned, whether
it is an external URL or an URL to another tweet. For ex-
ample:
External URL: Trump Schools CNN Reporter
in 1990 - Then Drops the Mic - Literally
{URL} #fakenews
Another Tweet: RT @{User}: This is an
abuse of his office. {Tweet}
(2) In the second step, the stored URLs are buerized and
consumed by another data collection process. Every 15
4hps://dev.twier.com/streaming/overview
5hps://dev.twier.com/rest/public/search
minutes we use Twier’s Search API to extract general
tweets that include the most relevant URLs stored, and
meta-data about the users who tweeted about them. is let
us capture the context surrounding the URLs in a broader
scenario, with no necessary association to misinformation-
related keywords or hashtags. We exemplify this with two
tweets mentioning the same URL with dierent contexts:
Fake-news context: Huffing ComPost is a
joke. Nobody believes their #fakepolls
or #fakenews. #MAGA {URL}
Indirect Fake-news context: Canadian
views of U.S. hit an all-time low, poll
shows, {URL}
e goal of this double-step collection process is to build a more
complete view of the fake news debate on Twier: we can see
both users who are referring to a content (i.e. an URL or another
tweet) as a potential source of fake news, and users who are citing,
propagating or interacting with the same content without aaching
to it the fake-news label.
e second dataset we used was obtained by collecting tweets
about US Politics in general from Twier Stream API. We use
keywords and hashtags such as {Hillary Clinton, #potus,
Donald Trump, White House, Democrats, Republicans. . .}.
e usefulness of this dataset on this work is to oer enough data
to accurately compute the degree of polarization of users from the
FN-dataset with respect to their leanings towards Republicans and
Democrats. is is explained in details in Section 3.2.
Some remarks on the methodology are that:
(1) Retweets and quote tweets are considered to be URLs to
another tweets;
(2) e choice of 15 minutes as a buer time was imposed by
limitations of Twier’s Search API;
DS+J’17, August 2017, Halifax, Canada Manoel Horta Ribeiro. et al.
(3) e data collection steps 1 and 2 were done from May 07
2017 to May 25 2017, whereas the collection of step 3 was
done from August 2016 to May 2017.
Using these data sources, we are able to analyze URLs that co-
occurred with #fakenews tags (obtained in step 1), the associated
reactions to this URL in the form of tweets (obtained in step 2), and
the polarization of some of the users who tweeted it (obtained in
step 3). is is depicted on the right-hand side of Figure 2.
When we capture any URL contained in a tweet, we are capturing
many dierent kinds of non-trivial interactions. For example, it has
been shown that retweets may express disagreement [16]. ese
subtleties have lile impact on our analysis, as we are interested
not in the type of reaction that a user has, but whether users from
dierently polarized groups react at all to the same URLs.
3.2 Estimating User’s Political Polarization
e main unit of information we want to correlate with fake news-
related tweets is the degree of polarization of Twier users to each
main side in US Politics – Republicans and Democrats. Notice that
as stated previously, we overload the word polarization to denote
how much an individual leans towards a set of views or an ideology.
ere is a plethora of methods designed to classify the political
leaning of social media users, which typically group themselves
in well-separated communities [9, 41]. Although our methodology
does not depend on the specic graph clustering algorithm, nding
communities on polarized topics is eased by the fact that it is usually
simple to nd seeds – users that are previously known to belong to a
specic community. In the case of the Twier datasets we take into
consideration, the ocial proles of politicians and political parties
are natural seeds that can be fed to a semi-supervised clustering
algorithm that expands the seeds to the communities formed around
them [6, 19, 24].
We assume that the number of communities K formed around a
topic T is known in advance and it is a parameter of our method.
To estimate user leanings toward each of the K groups (K=2 for
Democrats, Republicans), we employ a label propagation-like strat-
egy based on random walk with restarts [38]: a random walker
departs from each seed and travels in the user-message retweet
bipartite graph by randomly choosing an edge to decide which node
it should go next. With a probability (1 - α) = 0.85, the random
walker restarts the random walking process from its original seed.
As a consequence, the random walker tends to spend more time
inside the cluster its seed belongs to [6]. Each node is then assigned
to its closest seed (i.e., community), as shown in the node colors in
the sample of the graph displayed in Figure 1.
e relative proximity of each node to the two sets of seeds yield
a probability that this node belongs to each of two communities,
and can be interpreted as an estimate of his or her political leaning.
For instance, if proximity of node X to republican seeds is 0.01 and
its proximity to democrat seeds is 0.04, the random-walk based
community detection algorithm outputs that that node belongs to
the democrat community with 80% of probability. Note that this
modeling nature captures that some nodes may be more neutral
than others. For more details on the random walk-based community
detection algorithm, please refer to [6].
In our specic case study there are only two communities, thus
we can dene the polarization of a user u with an assigned polar-
ization value vu ∈ [0.5, 1.0] ∪ [−1.0,−0.5] as a random variable
Pu : [−1, 1] 7→ [0, 1] such that:
Pu =
{
2(−vu + 0.5) if u ∈ D
2(vu − 0.5) if u ∈ R
(1)
WhereR andD are the polarized groups of republicans and democrats.
Notice that we are simply changing the domain of the value as-
signed by the polarization algorithm to a more intuitive one ([−1, 1]).
We can further dene the absolute user polarization as a random
variable Au : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] such that:
Au = |Pu | (2)
3.3 Estimating URL’s Political Polarization
Another aspect of the data that needs to be modeled is the polar-
ization of an URL, or in other words, how it reverberates through
users in opposed polarized communities. We dene the degree
of polarization of an URL based on the polarization of users that
reacted to it. For the sake of simplicity, we consider as URLs any
links external to Twier or links to other tweets, and reactions are
normal tweets, quotes, replies and retweets that interact with the
URL.
We dene the polarization of a URLk , given two polarized groups
of users R and D, as a random variable Pk : [0, 1]n 7→ [0, 1] that is
the average of the polarization of users Pu that reacted to it:
Pk =
1
n
n∑
u ∈U(k )
Pu (3)
is calculation is depicted in the right-hand side of Figure 2.
In a similar fashion as we did for the polarization of users, we can
further dene the absolute URL polarization as a random variable
Ak : [0, 1]n 7→ [0, 1]:
Ak = |Pk | (4)
3.4 Domains and Impactful URLs
An important part of our analysis is trying to nd evidence that
users are employing ”fake news” related terms to express disagree-
ment, rather than a more factual lack of vericity in content they
tweet about. To do so, we analyze the URL domains mentioned by
each polarized sides in tweets associated to misinformation. We
also qualitatively analyze the content of some of the URLs that
generated the most signicant reactions.
To generate the domains we parse the external URLs mentioned
in the tweets. We then calculate the political polarization of each
domain exactly like we do for full URLs. e wordclouds are gener-
ated for all the external URLs with absolute polarization Ak bigger
than 0.5, one for each respective polarized group. For the analysis
of the content of the top reacted URLs, we randomly select 75 of
the top 150 URLs (tweets and external). Of those, we have equally
sized stratum where Ak belongs to intervals [0, 0.32], [0.33, 0.66]
or [0.67, 1]. We then analyze the content of URLs for insights on
dierent ways the fake news thematic may emerge.
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General Statistics Shared Users Shared Active Users
Source #users #active users #tweets #urls FN-Related Politics FN-Related FN-Related
FN-Related 374,191 101,031 833,962 109,397 - 29.22% - 37, 61%
Politics 4,164,604 247,435 246,103,385 - 2.62% - 15.72% -
Table 1: General characterization of the data sources. e intersection between the Politics dataset and FN-Related is impor-
tant as we use it to characterize the polarization of the users, and consequently of the URLs in the FN-Related datasets.
FN-Related Politics
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Figure 3: Average absolute user polarization for the users in the FN-Related and the Politics dataset. e error bars are the
95% condence intervals calculated using bootstrap. e increase in the polarization in the FN-Related dataset suggests that
the theme of misinformation increases polarization in an already polarized topic (politics).
4 RESULTS
We begin by characterizing the two datasets in terms of tweets,
URLs and users, as depicted in Table 1. Remember that the analysis
concerning URLs are all performed using the tweets of the dataset
we call FN-Related and the polarization of users of the dataset
named Politics.
e dataset sizes dier signicantly, but the intersection amongst
them grants us a signicant number of the users to perform the anal-
ysis with (29.22% of the 374, 191 users in the FN-Related dataset).
If we dene the active users in the Politics as the smallest set
of users responsible for 80% of the tweets collected, we have that
the intersection with the users from the FN-Related dataset grows
signicantly, increasing to 15.72% from the original 2.62%.
4.1 Polarization and Tweets
We begin by analyzing the dierence in polarization of the users in
the Politics dataset and the FN-Related dataset. Notice that all
the users that we know the polarization of in the second are also in
the rst. Figure 3 shows the average polarization in such datasets
looking at all users, but considering active or inactive users. e
signicant increase in polarization on the users that were associated
with URLs that co-occurred with ”fake news” related terms is an
indication that the theme of ”fake news” increases polarization in
the already polarized discussion of politics.
Another perspective that can be looked at is how the polariza-
tion of URLs changes according to characteristics of the reactions
associated to it. We analyze two aspects, namely: what is the impact
of the number of reactions surrounding an URL to its polarization,
and what is the impact of the percentage of reactions using key-
words and hashtags related to fake-news to the polarization of the
URL. Ordering the URLs according to these metrics, we plot the
average polarization of each one of its quartiles in Figures 4 and 5,
respectively. We analyze other tweets and external URLs separately.
Figure 4 shows that, in the collected dataset, the increase in the
number of reactions has a negative impact in the average polar-
ization of an URL. A beer interpretation of these results would
require a mapping of the interactions of the users. Figure 5 shows
an increase of the polarization when URLs are constantly associ-
ated with ”fake news” related keywords. is contributes to the
hypothesis that the ”fake new” thematic is a polarizing one.
4.2 Polarization and URL Domains
We generate wordclouds as described in Section 3.4, and the re-
sults can be seen in Figure 6(a) for democrat-leaning users and
in Figure 6(b) for republican-leaning users. Analyzing the typical
levels of trust towards dierent media sources gathered by the Pew
Research Center [27], we can see that democrat-leaning wordcloud
contains domains to news sources such as e Washington Post
and e New York Times, which are reportedly trusted by liberals
and distrusted by conservatives. Similarly, the republican-leaning
wordcloud contains domains to news sources such as Breitbart and
Fox News, trusted by conservatives and distrusted by liberals.
is implies that polarized group don’t directly mention some
report or news-piece as fake, but react to links of sources that they
agree with on the ”fake news” theme. It also indicates that sources
that users of a certain political ideology trust have a signicant im-
pact on their view of what is fake, as they are citing them as a source
rather than the piece of information they believe is misinformation.
4.3 Analyzing Top Reacted URLs
Analyzing the tweets which received the most reactions and that
co-occurred with ”fake news” related keywords allows us to beer
understand how these are being used. We perform our qualitative
analysis by giving and discussing examples of the dierent stratum
we dened and inspected.
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Figure 4: Average polarization per number of reactions to
an URL (quartiles). Error bars represent 95% condence in-
terval.
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Figure 5: Average polarization per ratio of tweets with
the URL containing the misinformation related keywords
(quartiles).
(a) Democrat-leaning users. (b) Republican-leaning users.
Figure 6: Domain clouds of #FakeNews-related tweets. Notice the presence of websites with the same ideology as the users in
the polarized groups. is indicates that users are reacting to sources they agree with on fake-news related narratives.
Among the randomly selected URLs, for example, the top reacted
external URL in the highly polarized stratum Ak ∈ [0.67, 1] is a
news-piece on Michael Flynn being cleared by the FBI as innocent
from his relationship with Russian [36]:
New York Post: FBI clears Michael Flynn in probe
linking him to Russia
It is important to notice that Flynn’s involvement with Donald
Trump’s campaign makes this piece of information more favorable
to republican-leaning users. Conrming the result obtained with
the analysis of the wordclouds in Section 4.2, however, the result
is polarized towards individuals supporting the Republican party.
is suggests that users are mainly dismissing a narrative of other
media sources that suggested the link of Flynn with Russia. e
terms associated with ”fake news” are thus not being employed
to denote that a content itself is fake, but denote other pieces of
information as false.
Another usage of the term we can nd analyzing the more re-
acted URLs is to refer to news which can be seen as ridicule. One of
the most reacted URLs in the less polarized stratum Ak ∈ [0, 0.32],
is about a prisoner who aempted to escape jail dressed as a woman
in Honduras [4]:
Telegraph: Prisoner dressed as woman in failed
escape bid
is usage, although not necessarily harmful for the political de-
bate, may present a challenge for automated techniques to detect
misinformation, if they employ what users in a network such as
Twier tag as fake as a feature.
Finally, we can also nd instances of users actually tagging actual
facts or stories as fake. An example of such case is a highly polarized
democrat-leaning news-piece Ak ∈ [0.67, 1] pointing the rebual
of a supposedly ”fake news” story on the murder of DNC sta:
Raw Story: Family blasts right-wing media for
spreading fake news story about slain DNC staer
as Russia scandal deepens
We didn’t nd examples of external URLs of a source known to
be trusted by an ideological group being polarized by the opposite
political in the our stratied sampling. However, there are cases
of tweets where this happens. For example, the following tweet
by Donald J. Trump [39] 6 is polarized towards democrat-leaning
users:
@realdonaldtrump: e Russia-Trump collusion
story is a total hoax, when will this taxpayer funded
charade end?
In this case democrat-leaning users may have suggested that what
Donald Trump is saying is fake. Previous studies have also shown
that retweets of well-known personalities most oen denote antag-
onism [16].
Although this analysis is not signicant to understand the rel-
evance of these dierent uses of ”fake news” related terms, it
provides insight on the plethora of scenarios that co-occur with
misinformation-related keywords and hashtags.
6We here merely discuss the polarization surrounding a tweet of a public person, not
infringing the terms of use of the Twier’s Developer Agreement & Policy.
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5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
is work is a rst aempt to observe correlations between polit-
ical polarization and the spread of misinformation, in particular
”fake news”. To tackle the practical challenge of having access to a
pre-classied set of fake news articles or tweets, we monitored the
external URLs and tweets associated with ”fake news” related hash-
tags and keywords. We searched for tweets reacting to these URLs
and calculated the polarization of the users who reacted to them
using an auxiliary more general dataset on politics. We examined
the association between polarization and fake news by analyzing
the impact of various factors in ”fake news” related URLs and users
we knew the polarization of. We also analyzed the dierent sources
that are mentioned as ”fake” by users and qualitatively described
dierent scenarios where the terminology is applied.
We found that fake-news related debate on Twier is highly
polarized in terms of the degree of bias of the users that react on
”fake news” related URLs and in terms the dierent sets of URL
domains that democrats and republicans engage with. We also
found that, in our dataset, the average polarization was higher
when many individuals were tagging a URL as fake. ese ndings
suggest that there is an increase in polarization in the context of
content that is related to or perceived as fake news. is tracing
of a relationship between polarization and content related to fake
news addresses our rst research question.
e analysis of the wordclouds of the democrat and republican-
leaning users as well as the qualitative examination of the contexts
where misinformation-related keywords and hashtags are employed
suggest that there is a signicant use of ”fake news” related key-
words to express disagreement. ese ndings address our second
research question. However, the measure to which this happens
needs to be assessed quantitatively, as our analyses don’t allow the
measurement of the impact of such usage.
e impact of polarization in the combat of fake news presents
new challenges and opportunities. On one side, if a signicant
amount of the messages relating content to fake-news expresses
disagreement, we have that machine learning methods that use
what users indicate as fake as a feature may become biased towards
one side of the polarization spectrum. On the other hand, we may
use community detection techniques to add polarization as a feature
that distinguishes fake and biased, or even nd users who are not
not extremely polarized, which would have a more trustworthy
judgment of what is misinformation.
As future work we want to explore methods to identify dierent
narratives around stories that emerge in distinct polarized commu-
nities. is could align potential ”fake news” or extremely polarized
articles with others that disprove or reject them, providing a mech-
anism to regulate the spread and misinformation the polarization
it causes in society [12, 43]. Another interesting direction would
be to further explore the association of fake news and polarization,
nding statements that are proven false by fact-checkers and mod-
eling the complex interactions (such as quotes and replies) between
users in social networks such as Twier.
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